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11．Takizawa’sLogos　Christology　and　Buddhism
　　　　　My　own　answer　to　the　foregoing“whence”question　is，　as
Ihave　been　trying　to　show　recently　on　other　occasions，18　by
way　of　the　idea　of　God　as　the　principle　of　loyalty　in　the　universe：
the　evocative　power　that　the　Logos　is，　comes　from　the　fact　that
“God，卿the　Logos，　is　supremely　loyal　to　Emptiness　emptying
itself．”Essential　to　this　idea　is　the　contention　as　follows：only
the　one　who　has　been　experiencing　loyalty　to　a　supreme　degree，
while　being　with　us　creatures　in　silence，　can　paradoxically
evoke　loyalty　in　us　with　authority．　By　this　I　am　saying　three
things：namely，（A）the　principle　of　God　as　being“with　us”
（which　is　what　Takizawa　wants　to　consider　in　terms　of　his
notion　of　the　Logos　as　the　P）fato－factum　lmmanuel）is　paradoxically
undergirding（B）the　principle　of　God　as“evocative”（which　is
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what　lies，　if　I　am　correct，　in　Tillich’sreference　to　agape　as　the
spiritual　foundation　of　democracy）simply　because（C）this　God
with　us　is　at　the　same　time　loyal　to　the　frame　of　reference　of
God’sbeing，　Emptiness　emptying　itself　as　this　expresses　itself
as　the　intra－Trinitarian“interrelatedness”（perichoresis／within
the　purview　of　Chistian　doctrine－an　insight　which　is　at　the
core　of　my　own　thesis．
　　　　　Let　me，　then，　scnltinize　and　elucidate　from　this　perspective
the　Logos　Christological　meanings　of　Takizawa’scritique　of
Shin’ichi　Hisamatsu’sZen　studies　and　of　his　critique　of　Karl
Barth’sunderstanding　of　Pure　Land　Buddhism．　Both　critiques　I
have　studied　carefully　in　my　1983　article“Principles　for　Interpreting
Christ／Buddha：Katsumi　Takizawa　and　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr．”for
BtZddhist－C枷゜stian　S伽4ゴ召s　3（1983）．（Hereafter　cited　as　PIC／B．）
Thus，　what　I　want　to　do　now　is　to　re－view　and　re－examine　my
major　points　in　the　article　from　the　said　perspective　of　my　own．
　　　　　　　　　　　’　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　りA．Takizawa　s　Critique　of　Shin　ichi　Hisamatsu：the　Primary　and
　　　Secondary　Points　of　Contact　betWeen　God　and　Humanity　and
　　　the　Problem　of　Zen　Buddhism
　　　　　Let　me　first　show　some　excerpts　from　the　original　article
of　mine　as　follows　．　My　critical　re－examination　of　the　text　will
come　later．
［Excerpt　1］（PIC／B，69－71）
　　　　　In　his　1964　book，　B編励ゴs辮α雇C肋’5’毎窺’砂（TKC，19
VII，249「361），Takizawa　critically　deals　with　Zen　Buddhism，
especially　Shin’ichi　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism20　from　the
perspective　of　his　Logos　Christology．　The　reason　why　he
has　chosen　Buddhism　as　a“true　counterpart　of　Christianity”
（TKC，　VII，350－51）is　that　he　finds　a　genuine　polarity
between　the　Buddhist　and　the　Christian　understanding　of
the　relationship　between　the　enlightened　or　faithful　and
the　unenlightened　or　unfaithful－and　this　within　the
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context　of　their　common　knowledge　of　th　Proto一ノiZctum
Immanuel．　The　Buddhist　realizes　his　or　her　own　nature
or　self　as“empty，”whereas　the　Christian　believes　in　Jesus
as　the　“Christ．”
　　　　　In　this　encounter　with　Hisamatsu’sZen　Buddhism，
Takizawa　has　given　an　expilcit　expression　to　the　Jesus－as－
Jesus－dimension　of　the　person　of　Jesus　Christ．　Takizawa　is
not　merely　applying　the　already　fbund　categories　of　Christology
to　his　consideration　of　Buddhism．　He　also　tries　to　deepen
his　theology　of“small　signs”［as　this　refers　to　whatever
apPear　in　the　world，　including　Jesus　of　Nazareth　and
other　religious　figures］through　encounter　with　Buddhism．
This　is　particularly　true　of　his　Zoku’Bte（kkアO　toκゴη’sutokyO
（ASequel　to“Buddhism　and　Christianity，”1979）．　In　this
work，　Takizawa　is　mainly　concerned　with　a　comparative
study　of　Jodo　Shin　Buddhism　and　Christianity．　By　means
of　this　comparative　study，　Takizawa　has　articulated　more
fully　the　Christ－dimension　in　its　depths．21
71he　leSUSras－lesus　1）吻徽’（肱7襯9α㎜伽z勿linddin’s〃z
From　the　perspective　of　Takizawa’stheology　of“small
signs，”Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism　with　its　emphasis　upon
the　“spontaneity”　of　satori，　utterly　devoid　of　theistic
heteronomy，　is　acceptable．　It　could　even　be　said“strictly
Christian，　and　in　fact　Christologica1”（TKC，VII，272）．
Usually，　Buddhism　is　considered　to　be　a　religion　of　self－
realization　in　contrast　to　Christianity　as　a　religion　of
faith．　But　Takizawa　denies　the　view　that　the　Christian
believes　in　God　as　something　merely　outside　the　human
being．　For　the　Christian　believes　in　God　who　is　through－
and－throughω伽us　humans．
　　　　　This　is　deCt’st’velアtrue　of　Jesus．　Commensurate　with
what　Hisamatsu　calls　the“non－ego　subject”（Jpn．，〃2π8吻襯
伽αのor“the　ohginal　self”（上）n．，homrai％oガ々o），Takizawa
understands　Jesus　of　Nazareth　as　the“spontaneous　self一
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acualization　of　the　Proto一ノiZctum”（TKC，　VII，273）．He
finds　a　parallelism　between　the　enlightened　one（i．e．，
Buddha）and知sus．　Indeed，1陀sus　is　a　Buddha．　Consequently，
faith　means　for　Takizawa　a　two－dimensional　actuality，　an
actuality　co－constituted　by　the　believer’sacceptance　of
the　bato－factum　herornow　and　by　his　or　her　being　influenced
by　the　past　actualization　of　the　P70’α一fa‘伽〃2　as　Jesus　as
the　Christ（TKC，　VII，274）．
　　　　　From　this　perspective　of　a　Buddhized　Christology，
Takizawa　shares　With　HisamatSu　in　stressing　the“p（）st－modem”
religiosity，　the　religiosity　of“breaking　through　［the
predicament　of］here　without　leaving［the　reality　of］
here”（TKC，　VII，276）．　This　religiosity　is　distinct　from
traditional　theism　or　theonomous　heteronomy　and　also
from　modern　humanistic　autonomy．　Hisamatsu　negates
not　only　mere　transcendentalism　but　also　mere　immanentalism．
He誼ims　only血e“transcendence止rough　sheer　immanence”
（Jl）n．，nei2aiteki　choetsu）．There　is　for　Hisamatsu　no　other
true　Buddha　than　the　selfless　I　who　is　the　true　subject　of
os◎－genso　or　of　going　to　the　Pure　Land（OsO）and　returnig
to　the　world（gensb）（TKC，　VII，261）．
　　　　　Fully　affirming　this　fact　with　Hisamatsu，　Takizawa
refers　to　the　possibility　of　the　knowledge　of　God　apart
ノンo鋭the　figure　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth，　based　upon　his
Christological　conviction　that　the　P）roto一加um，　immediately
related　to　any　human　being，　was　not　initiated　by　the
Incarnation　of　Jesus　Christ（TKC，　VII，280，282）．　This
possibility　implies　that　faith　as　a　two－dimentional　actuality
mentioned　above　is　not　exclusively　dependent　upon　Jesus
of　Nazareth．　The　relationship　of　the　Christian　believer　to
J6sus　is　rather　that　of　continuity－in－discontinuity．
　　　　　This　is　important　in　that　it　negates　a　view，　which
Hisamatsu　holds，　that　the　sheer　spontaneity　of　love　or
compassion　emerging　directly　from　the　original　self　is　the
only　basis　for　affirming　God（Jesus　Christ）or　Buddha
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（Amida）in　the　act　of“ideation”（TKC，　VII，220）．For
Takizawa，　the　existence　of　the　Proto－factum　Immanuel
alone　enables　us　humans　to　be　spontaneously　compassionate．
Takizawa’sunderstanding　of“spontaneity”now　tends　to
be　critical　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism．　Takizawa　criticizes
Hisamatsu　for　failing　to　recognize　the　difference　between
the　actual　sign，　the　original　self，　and　its　real　ground，　the
Proto－factec〃1，　In　this　Christological　reinterpretation　of
Buddhism，　Taldzawa　designates　the　Proto・－factum　the“primary
contact　of　Buddhahood　and　sentient　beings”and　distinguishes
it　from　its　sign　as　the“secondary　contact，”the　enlightened
human　self．
　　　　　But　here　arises　a　question：Is　this　extension　of
Takizawa’sconcept　of　the　Pr（）to－faStum　to　what　might　be
ultimate　in　Buddhism　adequate？There　are　at　present　two
conflicting　opinions　about　this　among　leading　Buddhist
scholars　in　Japan．　Some，　such　as　Ry6min　Akizuki　and
Gemp6　Hoshino，　affirm　Takizawa’scon㏄pt　of　the　1慨o一加彿η，
identifying　it　with　the　Zen　Buddhist　notion　of　hongaku
（original　enlightenment），　the　enlightenment　preceding
禰加肋（emergent　enlightenment　in　some　humans）（BKT，22
108；TKC，　VII，459－63）．　But　others，　represented　by
Masao　Abe，　interpret　it　as　a　consequence　of　delusion
because　the　ultimate　Bし1ddhist　standpoint　is　that　of　Emptiness
emptying　all　forms，　including　the　Proto－factum（BKT，
169－170，184）．This　split　of　opinions，　to　my　mind，　indicates
at　least　one　thing：Takizawa’snotion　of　the　Proto－－faCtum
Immanuel　is　only　anelogi’cally　applicable　to　Buddhism，　but
not　univocally，　as　is　so　intended　by　Takizawa．23
　　　　　Thus　far，　I　have　been　observing　in　Excerpt　l　that　Takizawa
clarifies　the　distinction　between　the　afore－mentioned　Logos
Christological　principle　of　God　as“with　us”or　the　Proto－factum
Immanuel（A）and　the　principle　of　God　as“evocative”（B）in
terms　of　what　he　designates　the　primary　and　the　secondary
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contact　of　God　and　humanity　while　at　the　same　time　critically
applying　it　to　the　case　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　vision　of　enlightenment．
As　I　noted　above，　Takizawa’sattempt　is　justifiable，　but　only
partially，　because　he　fails　to　attend　to　the　Buddhist　principle　of
Emptiness　emptying　itself　as　that　to　which，　as　I　have　contended，
God卿the　Logos　is　loyal（C）．　This　entails，　as　is　clear　in　my
examination　abOve，　an－analogical，　but　not　an　univoca1，　applicability
of　Takizawa’sdistinction　between　principles　A　and　B　to　Zen．
Let　me，　then，　show　below　the　positive　elements（see　Excerpts　2
and　3）and　the　negative，　questionable　element（see　Excerpt　4）
in　Takizawa’scritique　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　studies，　and　my　own
interpretation　of　it　as　a　whole（see　Excerpt　5）．
First，　the　positive　elements　as　follows：
［Excerpt　2］（PIC／B，71）
　　　　　Takizawa　criticizes　Hisamatsu’sview　of　continuity－in－
discontinuity　between　the“samsara－like”（五）n．，shoji’e々の
or　inauthentic　self　and　the　“nirvana－like”　（JI）n。，〃2召’｛蜘0’6勉）
or　authentic　self，　for　not　distinguishing　a　primary　continuity
（i．e．，the　absolute　fact　of　unity－in－distinction　in　the
depths　of　every　human　exitence　of　the　eternal，　universal
Buddhahood　and　the　spatio－temporal　sentient　beings）and
asecondary　continuity（i．e．，the　emergence　of　a　true
man　as　the　enlightened）．　Then　Takizawa　proceeds　to
state：
It［the　secondary　continuity］can　positively　represent
the　true　Absolute　only　insofar　as　it　points　to　the
vanishingっoint，　as　it　were，　of　al1　the　forms，　including
itself，　that　appear　in　this　world．　If　we　call　such　a
representative　figure　‘Buddha，’we　will　have　to
㏄㎞owledge　as　a　matter　of　course［against　Hisamatsu］
that　there　really　exists　a　truly　eternal　Buddha‘who
is　higher　and　more　absolute　than，’and‘who　is
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other　than　and　is　distinct　from’the　humanly　enlightened
Buddha．　No　matter　how‘unthinkable　from　the
orthodox　standpoint　of　Buddhism，’we　cannot　but
acknowledge　that　reality　of　Buddha　since　it　discloses
itself　by　opening　the　depths　of　our　closed　hearts．　It
would　be　owing　to　the　obscurity　about　this　point
remaining　unchecked　in　historical　Buddhism　that
the　Buddhists，　who　‘play　a　divine　play　even　in　the
midst　of　the　woods　of　worldly　clingings　and　show
the　power　of　enlightenment　while　entering　the
garden　of　life－and－death，’　are　apt　to　fall　into　a
self－righteousness　ignoring　stricltly　scientific　studies
of　things．（TKC，　VII，324－25；trans．　mine）
This　critical　scrutiny　by　Takizawa　of　the　humanly　enlightened
Buddha　as　the　secondary　continuity，　undergirded　by　the
existence　here－now　with　us　of　the　truly　eternal　Buddha，
is　through－and－through　Chirstological．　In　this　sense，　it
not　only　affirms　a　spontaneous　emergence　of　enlightenment
（consider　here　Jesus　as　a　Buddha）　but　also　proposes　a
hierarchical　order　between　enlightenment　and　its　ontological
basis，　Buddhahood（consider　here　the　will　of　God　the
Father）．This，　I　think，　is　one　of　the　best　possible　inter－
pretations　of　Buddhism　from　a　Christian　perspective．
［Excerpt　3］（PIC／B，72－73）
　　　　　In　his　critique　of　Hisamatsu，　Takizawa　also　takes　up
the　problem　of　how　to　understand　the　real　meaning　of
what　Hisamatsu　calls　the“original　Buddha”and　the
“ecpaya（or　expedient）Buddha．”For　Hisamatsu，　the　original
Buddha　is　the　selfless　，　enlightened　human　subject；any
Buddha　apart　from　that　human　subject，　for　instance，　a
theistic　Buddha　like　Amida，　is　a　secondary，　upaya　Buddha；
and　this　upaya　Buddha　in　reality　is　nothing　other　than　the
original　Buddha　himself（i．e．，the　enlightened）as　viewed
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in　relation　to　the　unenlightened　as　a“skillful　means”of
their　satori．　Takizawa　opposes　this　view．　For　what　Hisamatsu
perceives　as　preceding　the　utnya　Buddha，　i．e．，the　human
original　Buddha，　is　himself　a　kind　of　a　upaya　Buddha　of
the　only　absolute　original　Buddha　（i．e．，Buddhahood）
who　really　is　at　the　base　of　every　self（TKC，　VII，334）．
　　　　　For　Takizawa　the　human　expression　of　Buddhahood
can　only　occur　as　a　historical－social　expession　of　the
eternally　actual　point－of－contact　（as　the　Proto－factu〃2）　of
Buddhahood　and　the　human　self．　Therefbre，　there　necessarily
arises，輌曲止e　scope　of　the　human　Buddha，　a　ram箇cation
of　the　mode　of　representing　the　absolutely　active　original
Buddha　and　the　mode　of　representing　the　absolutely
passive　upaンa　Buddha．　The　relationship　between　Jesus　of
Nazareth　and　his　disciples　is　an　example　of　this　ramification
（TKC，　VII，335）．　In　this　context　Jesus　means　for　Taldzawa
aum°魔?Qrsal　human　figure　or　the　humanly　operative　criterion
of　all　human　figures；he　is　something　like　the　mathematical
figure　l　in　the　world　of“signs”in　terms　of　the　predication
of　God（TKC，　VII，299）．
　　　　　Second，　let　me　turn　to　the　negative，　quesionable　case　of
Takizawa’scritique　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　studies：
［Excerpt　4］（PIC／B，73－74）
　　　　　Takizawa’scritique　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism　is
through－and－through　Christological　as　in　the　above．　It
has　a　merit　in　pointing　out　the　one　who　precedes　and
undergirds　the　humanly　authentic　figure，　whether　Jesus
or　the　enlightened　person．　For　Takizawa　the　one　who
precedes　Jesus　is　God　the　Father　or　Creator　who　is　with
us　creatures　in　the　Proto－factum　Immanuel　or　the　Logos．
But　here　arises　a　question：Is　what　Zen　Buddhists，　such
as　Hisamatsu　，　call　Buddhahood　or　Formless　Self　the　same
reality　as　God　the　Father　or　Creator？Takizawa　adheres　to
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this　identification　in　his　critique　of　Hisamatsu．　Within　the
scope　of　this　identification　it　necessarily　follows　that　there
must　be　something　like　the　Proto一ノiZctum　as　the　Logos　in
Zen　Buddhism，　too．
　　　　　But　it　seems　to　me　that　Zen　Buddhists，　such　as
Hisamatsu　and　Abe，　deny　that　identification　because
Buddhahood　is　formless，　whereas　God　the　Father　or
Creator　has　a　form－form　of　creation－however　invisible
and　supreme（BKT，146，150）．　They　also　deny　the　Proto－
faCtu〃z，　in　the　sense　of　the　substantial　unity　of　Buddhahood
and　sentient　beings，げit〃leans　the　Logos，　For　the　Zen
experience　is　utterly　devoid　of　anything　like　the　Christian
Logos　although　it　is　related　to　the　coincidence　of　Buddhahood
and　the　self．24　Rather，　Zen　Buddhists　experience　that
Buddhahood　is〃ze，　that　there　ca皿be　no　satori　if　anything
－however　divine－is　interjected　between　Buddhahood　and
廿le　self．　This　is　because　Buddhahood　in　reality　is“Buddhah∞d
and　me．”25　Buddhahood，　as　the　al1－encompassing　Reality，
by　definition　includes　in　Itself　worldly　actualities　by　the
principle　of　Ptatitya－sa〃zUtpada　or　dependent　co一〇rigination．
That　is　to　say，　there　can　be　no　satori　if　any　single　bit　of
over－against－ness　of　the　divine　remains　in　one，　s　self－realiZation．
Accordingly，　satori　is　awakening　to　the　fact　that“I　am
Buddhahood”because　I　am“I　and　Buddhahood．”
　　　　　This　requires　a　partial　revision　of　Takizawa’sidenti－
fication　of　Jesus　with　a　Buddha．　If　he　means　by　this
identification　that　Jesus　is　like　a　Buddha　in　conforming
perfectly　to　the　will　of　God　the　Father，　there　might　be　no
correlative　to　this　on　the　part　of　Zen　Buddhism．　For　the
Zen　Buddhist　wants　to　become　himself　Formless　Self　or
Buddhahood　with　total　fearlessness　to　face　reality．　What
matters　now　is　courage　to　be　here　and　to　realize　oneself
rather　than　faith　in　God　as　Wholly　Other（totaliter　a’iter）．
Accordingly，　the　Jesusイigure　that　we　could　envisage　from
this　perspective　is　not　one　who　was　obedient　to　the　will
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of　God　the　Father　but　one　who　was　utterly　self－effected
like　the　figure　of　the　Son　of　Man　with　whom　Jesus　identified
himself．as　Along　these　lines　the　Whiteheadian　understanding
of　the“kingdom　of　heaven”as　God’sderivative　nature
that　is　“consequent　upon　the　creative　advance　of　the
world”27　will　make　sense．　That　is　to　say，　Jesus　as　the
derivative　nature　of　God　is　consequent　upon　the　self－effected
appeara皿ce　of　Creativity　as　Buddhahood．
　　　　　Third，　I　would　like　to　refer　to　my　own　interpretation　of
Takizawa’scritique　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism：
［Excerpt　5］（PIC／B，74－75）
　　　　　This［the　foregoing　discussion　of　mine］does　not，
however，　devaluate　the　fundamental　significance　of　Takizawa’s
double　thesis　of　the　Proto－faCtum　Immanuel　as　the　Logos
and　of　the　sign－character　of　the　figure　of　Jesus　of　Nazareth．
As　long　as　it　points　to　the　sozerce　of　what　I　would　call　the
intended　instrumental　value　of　human　nature，　the　onto－
Christological　part　of　his　thesis，　i．e．，　the　Proto－factu〃z
Immanuel，　is　valid；Takizawa’scritique　of　Hisamatsu　hits
the　mark．　For　Hisamatsu　does　not　clarify　the　source　of
compassion　or　agape　as　such．　The　axiological　part　of
Takizawa’sthesis，　i．e．，the　sign－character　of　Jesus　of
Nazareth，　is　also　valid　insofar　as　it　accounts　for　the　truly
human　and　God－less　nature　of　Jesus－but　only　in　terms　of
Jesus’obedience　to　the　will　of　God　the　Father　in　his
case．　His　affirmation　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　a－theism　seems
to　be，　accordingly，　the　consequence　of　a　GOdrless　C㎞stianity
like　that　of　Dietrich　Bonhoeffer．28　Both　Takizawa　and
Bonhoeffer　negate　a　G6d　who　is　simply　a　working　hypothesis
needed　for　human　speculation，　precisely　because　they
affirm　and　believe　in　God　who　really　is．　But　in　the　case
of　Hisamatsu，　the　authenticity　of　his　Zen炉theism　solely
consists　in　the　fact　that　satori　needs　mo　God，　mot　even　a
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real　God．
　　　　　At　any　rate，　Takizawa’sthesis　is　valid　as　long　as　it
concerns　itself　with　the　divine－human　relationship　in
terms　of　the“intended　instrumenta1”structure　of　life．　As
is　superby　analyzed　by　him，　this　structure　consists　of　an
irreversible，　hierarchical　order：（1）God　the　Father；（2）
the　Proto－faCtum　Immanuel；and（3）Jesus　or　an　authentic
human　person．　This　structure　is　not，　however，　applicable
to　the　Buddhahood－sentient　beings　relationship　which，　I
assume，　constitutes　the“intrinsic”structure　of　life　or　the
“intrinsic　value”of　human　nature．　As　a　result，　Takizawa’s
interpretation　of　Buddhism　is　in　its　essence　theistic；he
cannot　account　for　anything　in　the　universe　apart　from
the　concept　of　God，　God　in　Ms　triune　essence　and　imction．
Therefore，　it　is　with　reason　that　Taldzawa　is　less　successful
in　his　critical　Christian　interpretation　of　Zenα一theism
than　of　the　theistic　structure／dynamics　of　J6do　Shin
Buddhism，　our　next　subject　matter．
　　　　　In　s㎜，　what　I　have囲ly血ssed　in　my　teacher　Takizawa’s
Logos　Christological　critique／understanding　of　Hisamatsu’sZen
studies　is　the　direct　knowledge　of　the　human　being’srelatedness
to　Buddhahood．　This　constitutes　the　intrinsic　nature／value　of
any　and　every　human　and　non－human　sentient　being．　In　this
sense，　each　sentient　being　is　o班010g諺’αz〃．y　1のial　to　Buddhahood　or
Dha㎜akaya　or　Emptiness　emptying　itself．　The　problem，　however，
is　whether　one　is　conscr’（）zesly　loッα1　to　Buddhahood　or　Dharmakaya
or　Emptiness　emptying　itself　while　bringing　to　one’sown
attention　one’sontological　loyalty　in　which　one　is　living　in
actuality　willy－nilly．　Itゴs　preCt’sθ1アan’thin砺s　partionta7　conteκ∫，　tet
魏θe〃ψ加St’ze　here，’加’we　can　Sαツthat　Go4ゴS　supte〃iely　10ツα1’O
E〃1P∫in6SS　6〃ψ∫y2°ng髭Sθ’ア，　while　being‘‘ωπぬUS，，　in’んe　αZ加α”ツ0∫the
Lo90S．　Herein〃es　Go4’S　own　Sθ1／Lrealiza彦ion　O7　satort’，げ1a〃2
correct．
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B．Takizawa’sCritique　of　Karl　Barth：Christology　and　the
　　　Problem　of　Pure　Land　Buddhism
　　　　　It　is　for　this　reason　that　I　wanted　to　add　my　Principle　C，
God’sloyalty　to　Emptiness　，　to　Principles　A　and　B（namely，　the
principle　of　God“with　us”and　the　principle　of（x）d　as“evocative”）
which　I　found　in　Takizawa’sLogos　Christological　discussion　of
Zen　Buddhism．　Let　me，　however，　make　my　point　clearer　by
reference　to　Takizawa’scritical　discussion　of　the　problem　of
Pure　Land　Buddhism　in　what　follows．　Now　his　dialogue－partner
is　Karl　Barth．　I　will　show　below　four　excerpts，　one　in　reference
to　Takizawa’scritique　of　Barth　and　the　rest　of　the　excerpts
manifesing　his　own　Logos　Christological　view　of　the　parallelism
between　Christianity　and　Pure　Land　Buddhism：
［Excerpt　6］（PIC／B，75－76）
The　lesus－as→he－C例’st　D吻ension　：Tα々izawa　on／bdo　Shin
餓短s挽
In　an　essay　entitled“lk）do　Shin　Buddhism　and　Christianity：
In　Relation　to　Karl　Barth’sFootnote　in　Chztrch　Dogmatics
1／2”（1973），Takizawa　attempts　to　show　a　parallelism
between　the　two　religions　by　critically　surveying　what
Karl　Barth　writes　on　Jodo　Shin　Buddhism　in　K〃c〃iche
Dogmatik　1／2，　pp．372ff．　According　to　Barth，　the　decisive
difference　between　the　two　religions　is　that　only　Christianity
knows　the　Name　of　Jesus　Christ．　He　rejects　the　opinion，
which　has　been　held　by　some　of　the　representatives　of　the
RE～lig諺゜o多zs－an’ssenschaノン　school，　that　Christianity　is　different
from　and　superior　to　Jbdo　Shin　Buddhism　in　that　it　has
more　plausible　symptoms　of　being　a　true　religion，　i．e．，a
religion　of　grace，　than　the　latter．　That　is，　Barth’stheological
method　of　comparison　is　stricltly　Christological　rather
than　phenomenologica1．
　　　　　This　does　not，　however，　mean　that　Barth　is　not
interested　at　all　in　a　phenomenological　comparison．　In
fact，　he　develops　one　such　comparison　as　follows：（1）
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The　Jodo　movement，　unlike　the　Reformation　by　Luther
and　Calvin，　started　from　the　popular　desire　for　an　easier
and　simpler　way　of　salvation；（2）Jodo　Shin　Buddhism，
unlike　genuine　evangelical　Protestantism，　lacks　the　doctrines
of　God’sor　Amida’slaw，　holiness，　and　wrath；（3）The
“Other　Power”doctrine　of　Jodo　Shin　Buddhism，　distinct
from　Paul　and　Cah加，1acks　a　strong　emphasis　on　striving
against　the　selfisheness　and　arrogance　of　humanity，　and
striving　for　God’sglory；and（4）Jodo　Shin　Buddhism　is
motivated　by　the　human　desire　of　attaining　Buddahood，
rather　than　by　faith　in　Amida，　because　Amida　is　also　in
the　process　of　attaining　Buddhahood（ZBK，21－22）．
　　　　　Takizawa　rejects　each　of　these　phenomenological
critiques　of　Jodo　Shin　Buddhism　by　Barth　as　baseless：（1）
Barth　fails　to　see　that　Shinran’sfaith（JPn．，sん勿ブ伽）is
finally　rooted　in　a　desire　deeper　than　the　popular　one，
namely，　the　desire　of　accepting　Amida’sOriginal　Prayer
or　Vow（／勿．，　hongan；Skt．，purvapアanidhana），which
Shinran　calls　the“difficulty　of　all　difficulties；”（2）Barth
does　not　notice　that　the　recitation　of　the　Nembutsu　was，
for　Shinran，　the“direct　command　of　Amida；”（3）and（4）
of　Barth’scritique　are　simply　repudiated　by　Shinran’s
works，　such　as　Yuishinshe－mon一ゴ（Notes　on　‘Essentials　of
Faith’）and万脚一hont’－sho（On　Naturalness　of　Faith）（ZBK，
69－72）．Ih　short，　in　Takizawa’sview，　Barth　never　understands
that　Shinran’sJodo　Shinsha　is　grounded　on　the　living，
ever　present　Buddha（ZBK，72）．29
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　’　　　　　It　is　important　to　note　that　Takizawa　s　critiques　of
Barth’smisunderstanding　of　Jodo　Shin　Buddhism　are
based　upon　his　Christology　critical　of　Barth．　He　finds　the
basic　reason　for　Barth’smisunderstanding　in　his　ambiguous，
undifferentiated　view　of　the“Name　of　Jesus　Christ．”To
be　sure，　Barth　differentiates　the　Name　of　Jesus　Christ
ffom　all　the　symptoms　of　it，　including　Christian　doctrines，
sacraments，　and　ministries　of　the　Church．　But　he　never
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differentiates　in　that　Name　the　Christ　as　the　Proto－fa吻初
Immanuel　from　Jesus　of　Nazareth　as　its　actual，　living
sympton（ZBK，36－44）．
　　　　　It　is　precisely　from　this　perspective　that　Takizawa
develops　a　unique　view　of　parallelism　between　Jodo　Shin
Buddhism　and　Christianity．　First，　he　ref6rs　to　the　parallelism
between　Jesus　as　the　Christ　and　Dharmakara　Bodhisattva
as　Amida　Buddha．　Second，　he　compares　the　doctrine　of
creation　with　the　Buddhist　teaching：‘All　existences　are
Buddhahood．’30　Third，　he　deals　with　the　doctrine　of　the
Trinity　in　parallel　with　the’7ゴ加翅一doctrine，　i．e．，the
Buddhist　vision　of　the　unity　between　D繍）a　（Dharma－body
or　Buddhahood），翫〃肋0㈱翅（Body　of　Bliss　or　R㏄ompense），
and」聯吻駕々aya（Manifest　Body）．
　　　　　　Let　me　now　show　my　condideration　of　these　parallel
points　one　by　one　in　the　following　three　excerpts：
［Excerpt　7］　（PIC／B，76－77）
（1）Jesus　of　Nazareth　was　a　historical　person　who　actually
由ed　on　the　cross　two　thousand　years　ago．　On　the　contrary，
Dharmakara（i．e．，the　Storehouse　of　Dharma）Bodhisattva，
is　mentioned　in　the　Larger　5’utra　of」Etermal　Life，　which　is
attributed　to　the　historical　Sakyamuni．　However，this
difference　does　not　prevent　Takizawa　from　stating　that　the
name　or　the　existence　of　Dharmakara　Bodhisattva（JPn．，
H∂zO　B（）sαtszt）was　not　a　conceptual　product　of　Sakyamuni
or　a　general　idea　which　has　nothing　to　do　with　our
actual　existence．　Insofar　as　he　is　portrayed　in　the　above
sutra　quite　concretely　as　an　actual　individual　person，
Dharm且kara　Bodhisattva　is　a　spatio－temporal　event．　However，
this　does　not　mean　for　Takizawa　that　the　Bodhisattva’s
practices　and　his　famous　forty－eight　vows　with　the　purpose
of　saving　all　sentient　beings　on　earth　are　separable　from
the　ever　present，　all－inclusive　Life　and　Light，　Amida
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Buddha．　Rather，　these　are　the　Bodhisattva’shuman
correspondences　to　Amida’sOriginal　Vow（ZBK，56－57）．
　　　　　Takizawa　then　develops　an　intriguing　discussion　on
the“causal　relationship”（JPn．，∫㎎i）between　Dharmakara
Bodhisattva　and　Amida　Buddha．　The　discussion　deals　with
two　correlated　propositions：“Dharmakara　Bodhisattva
became　Amida　by　making　forty－eight　vows；”and“Amida
Buddha　became　Dharmakara　Bodhisattva．”The　principle　of
causality　involved　herein　is　not　primarily　a　spatio－temporal
succession　but　is　rather　an“eternally　present，　absolutely
dialectical　relationship，”which　Takizawa　designates　the
“Dhannakara　Bodhisattva（脚Amida　Buddha．”He　writes：
　　　　　Both　propositions　never　mean　the　transformation　of
　　　　　one　into　the　other，　or　a　unification　or　combination
　　　　　of　the　two，‘somehow’actualized　by　a‘supematural－
　　　　　personal’power，　which　otherwise　would　remain
　　　　　separate　from　each　other　by　the　immeasurable，　deep
　　　　　cleft－as　still　today　is‘believed’and　taught　by　most
　　　　　of　the　representatives　of　this　Buddhist　school．　No，
　　　　　Dharmakara　and　Amida　are　really　distinctively　two
　　　　　different　entities，　and　yet　are　one－－but　in　an　absolutely
　　　　　irreversible　order．　The‘became’°therefore　points　to
　　　　　the　unique，　dynamic　relationship　between　the　two．
　　　　　The　first　proposition，‘Dharmakara　became　Amida，’
　　　　　means　that　Dharmakara’svow　was，　to　be　sure，　the
　　　　　choice　of　a　mortal　human　person　throughout，　and
　　　　　yet　never　orginates　in　his　human　subjectivity　but
　　　　　only　in　the　original　gracious　will　of　Amida．　Insofar，
　　　　　it　is　in　itself　the　merciful　Vow　of　Amida！The
　　　　　second　proposition　means　that　Amida　in　the　act　of
　　　　　Vow　has　revealed　himself　in　the　form　of　the　man
　　　　　Dhamlakara，　and　that　Buddha　only　as　Amida　manifests
　　　　　himself　out　of　his　genuine　mercy　as　the　man
　　　　　Dharmakara，　and　is　the　true，　eternally－present
　　　　　Buddha．31
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　　　　　As　is　evident　in　this　passage，　Takizawa　thinks　of
the　relationship　between　Amida　and　Dharmakara　in　terms
of　an“irreversible　order，”the　order　which　includes　in
itself　the　elements　of“inseparableness”and“non－iden廿丘ability．　
We　can　find　here　a　Shin　Buddhistic　expression　of　his
Logos　Christology．
　　　　　Takizawa’sconclusion　of　the　comparative　study　of
Jbso　Shin　Buddhism　and　Chhstiantiy　is　this：in　the　Christian
confession　of　J6sus　as　the　Christ　the　divinity　in　his　existence
comes　to　the　fore，　whereas　in　the　1卿SUtra　the　Bodhisattva
as　a　seeker，　therefore　his　humanity，　seems　to　be　the
primary　concern．　Yet，　an　essential　parallelism　between
the　two　traditions　is　never　to　be　denied．　This　conclusion
is　challenged　by　an　oPPosite　view　of　John　Cobb’s：in　both
religions　we　deal　with　a　circle　in　which　both　ultimate　and
actual　aspects　are　needed．　In　the　Pure　Land　tradition，
beliefs　about　ultimate　reality　may　play　the　primary　role，
whereas　in　Christianity　beliefs　about　the　actual　course　of
events　may　be　primary．sa　Why　do　our　two　authors，　although
unanimously　affirming　the　Christian－Shin　Buddhist　parallehsm，
differ　in　their　respective　evaluations　of　the　actual　or
human　and　the　ultimate　or　divine　in　both　religions？This
might　be　because　Takizawa　is　more　attentive　to　what　he
terms　the“irreversible　order”in　both　religions，　whereas
Cobb　is　more　appreciative　of　what　is　usually　called　the
“finality　or　centrality　of　the　salvific　events”in　them．
　　　　　In　this　excerpt－Excerpt　7－is　manifest　what　I　call　Takizawa’s
Logos　Christological　Principles　A　and　B（namely，　the　principle
of　God　as“with　us”and　the　principle　of　God　as“evocative”）in
correspondence　with　Amida　and　Dharmakara　Bodhisattva．　As　far
as　this　point　is　concerned，　Takizawa’sLogos　Christological
theology　of　religions　is　profoundly　effective．　However，　this　does
not　qualify　him，　as　we　will　see　below　in　the　next　excerpt，　to
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be　equally　effective　in　the　matter　of“creation”whose　Buddhist
consideration　is　to　be　seen　against　the　background　of　the　idea：
“All　existences　are　Buddhahood．”
［Excerpt　8］（PIC／B，77－78）
（2）The　parallelism　between　the　two　religions　in　terms　of
Christology　enables　Takizawa　to　discern　a　parallelism　in
terms　of　the　doctrine　of　creation．　He　finds　a　textual　basis
for　this　view　in　Shinran’sessay　entitled｝「uishinsho－man’
（Noes　on　‘Essentials　of　Faith　Alone’）．　Shinran　states　that
Buddhahood　is　co－eternal　withハlyorai（Skt．，　Tathagata）
who　fills　the　universe　through　and　through，　namely，　who
is　the　heart　of　the　ocean　of　all　beings（ZBK，75）．ss　Then
Takizawa　assumes　that　Shinran　came　to　realize　this　truth－the
truth　that“all　existences　are　Buddhahood”－only　through
his　existential　encounter　with　Amida　qua　Dharmakara．
Amida　is　the　image　or　Form　of　the　one　Formless
1）harmata　Dharma々aya（Jpn．，Hossho　H∂ss1吻）．As　such，　he
is〃te　skillful　means（JPn．，盈）ben　H∂5s勉η），　Original　Vow，
or　SambhOgakaya（Body　of　Bliss　or　Recompense）for　the
sake　of　the　salvation　of　all　sentient　beings．　Then　Amida
as　Sam∂hOgakaya　appears　on　earth，　taking　innumerable
forms　or　bodies　and　illuminating　the　universe　by　the
Light　of　Wisdom：this　is　theハ厚轍πα勧翅（Manifest　Body）
（ZBK，75）．
　　　　　　In　parallel　with　Shinran’sthesis　stated　above，
Takizawa　prizes　Karl　Barth’svision　of“creation．”Karl
Barth　never　speaks　of　the　Creator　or　the　creature　apart
from　the　Proto一プ’aCtum　Immanuel（ZBK，73）．Only　through
the　knowledge　of　the　divine－human　relationship　hidden　in
the　person　of　Jesus　Christ　or　of　Dharmakara卿Amida，
we　come　to　realize　that　relationship　in　every　creature　in
the　universe．　In　this　sense，　Takizawa，　with　Barth，　is
through－and－through　Christocentric　in　his　apProach　to
creation．
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　　　　　　However，　as　we　have　shown　in　the　preceding
sub－section［see　II，　A，1，　above］，　this　approach　does　not
apply，　except　analogically，　to　the　Zen　Buddhist　truth　that
“Buddhahood　is　me．”Ido　not　mean　by　this　that　Takizawa
has　not　elucidated　the　Buddhist　truth　that“all　existences
are　Buddhahood”in　a　Christological　way．　What　I　mean　is
simply　this：Takizawa　has　hastily　identified　a　theistic　or
Christological　approach　to　Buddhahood　with　an　a－theistic
one．　It　is　true　that　Buddhahood　is　one　and　the　same
Buddhahood．　But　it　is　also　true　that　an　atheistic　approach
to　It　is　unique；this　apProach　is　inexplicable　by　a　theistic
one．　Accordingly，　we　can　only　explain　the　coincidence　of
both　approaches　in　analogical　terms　with　Buddhahood
being　the　point　of　coincidence．
　　　　　　What　I　mean　by　analogy　here　is　the　analogy　of
extrinsic　（or　symbolical）　attribution　dztontm　ed　tertittm　as　it
is　creatively　reinterpreted　within　our　dialogical　context。　It
is　well　known　that　in　his　doctrine　of　Analogia　Entis，
Thomas　Aquinas　discarded　this　type　of　analogy　because
there　might　be　no　such　thing　as　the　third　referent　above
and　beyond　the　reality　of　God　and　creation．　He　could　not
think　of　anything　other　than　some“genus，”which　he
denied　with　justice　，　as　the　tertiary　in　this　regard．　But　it
is　my　contention　that　Buddhahood，　for　instance，　is　not　a
“genus”in　the　sense　of“idea”or“fo㎜”but　is　the　ultimate
reality　as　the　prime　analogate，　to　which　God　and　creation
together　refer　analogically．　Hence，　a　creative　use　of　this
type　of　analogy　is　viable　in　the　Christian－Buddhist　dialogue．34
　　　　　Important　in　my　argument　above　for　the　analogical　grasp
of　what　lies　at　the　core　of　Buddhist－Christian　dialogue　is　the
insight　that　God　and　sentient　beings　both　refer　analogically　to
the　tertiary　reality，　Buddhahood　or　Dharmakaya　or　Emptiness
emptying　itself．　In　other　words，　we　can　say　that　Takizawa’s
idea　of　the　Proto－factum　Immanuel（God　with　us）implies　that
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there　is　nothing　between　God　and　us，　this“nothing”being
Buddhist　Emptiness　emptying　itself．　I　might　contend　that　this
Buddhistic　meaning　of　the　Prota－faαtum　is　manifested　within　the
entire　divine　life　and　alsoα4　entra（toward　the　world　of　creation）
in　and　through　the　Proto－factum　as　the　Logos，　and　that　the
latter　is　supremely　consciously　loyal　to　the　former，　thus　realizing
itself．
　　　　　Now，
considers：
let　me　tum　to　the　third　and　Iast　parallelism　Takizawa
［Excerpt　9］（PIC／B，78－79）
（3）Takizawa’sstudy　of　the　parallelism　between　the　two
religions　culminates　in　his　trinitarian　re　fe　rence　to　Amida
as　Original　Vow，　as　H∂∬加。H∂sshin，　and　as　operative　in
the　very　act　of　recitation　of　theハXe〃zbUtsu　（thinking　of　and
uttering　the　Name　of　the　Buddha）：“Namu　Amida　Butsu”
（Itake　refuge　in　Amida　Buddha）．The　relationship　between
those　three　modes　of　Buddha，　though　expressed　in　a
different　conceptuality，　reminds　Takizawa　of　the　trinitarian
unity　of　the　Son（i．e．，the　concrete－indiviual　God　who
exists　in　individual　beings），the　Father（i．e．，the　concrete－－
universal　God　who　eternally　exists　everywhere），　and　the
Holy　Spirit（i．　e．，　the　God　who　is　at　work　in　the　world，
expressing　himself　in　finite　beings）（ZBK，61）．There　is　a
striking　Passage　in　Takizawa’sexplication　of　Jodo
ShinshO．　In　that　passage，　he　explicates　Shinran’sexpression：
“Amida　Buddha　as　eterne〃アrealized”（Jpn．，々％o”ブゴ纏ブo
Amida　Butsu）：In　the　traditional　ShinshO　exposition
Amida　Buddha　is　simply　designated　the　Upaya　Buddha，
but　is　never　called　the　1）har〃zakaya．　But　as　is　clear　in
that　expression　by　Shinran，　it　cannot　follow　from　here
that　there　is　any　bit　of　difference　in　ontological　value　or
in　power　between　Amida　and　the　Dharmata　1）harmak⑳a
（Jpn．，Hossho　11∂sshin）．　Amida　is　the伽ya　Buddha　only
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insofar　as　he　is　the　Dharmata　1）hαrmakaya　as　conditioned
by　the　fact　that　he　is　the　hidden　（i．e．，sourceless　or
groundless）source　or　aim　of　the　man　Dharmakara　living
and　making　the　forty－eight　vows，　that　is，　by　the　fact　that
he　is　directly　at　one　with　each　sinner　in　an　absolute
distinction　and　order．（ZBK，137）．
　　　　　This　passage　is　amazingly　akin　to　Cobb’sinsight　that
Shinran　strongly　tendS　to　renounce血e　general　Buddhist　subOrdination
of　Amida　to　ultimate　reality　as　such　so　far　as　practical　and
rehgious　matters　are　concemed．ss　Cobb　too　denies　the　subordination
of　Amida　to　ultimate　reality；but　he　denies　it　not　in　terms　of
ontological　equality　but　in　terms　of　incommensurability　of　the
twO．
　　　　　Takizawa　calls　Amida’sVow“Proto－roガas　distinct　from
the　man　Dharmakara’s；the　primordial　nature　of　the　former　vow
is　valid　both　ontically　and　functionally（ZBK，137）．　To　articulate
this　comparatively，　Takizawa　refers　to　the“relationship　of
Christ　with　God　the　Father（as　co－eternal）”（ZBK，137）．　We
could　compare　here　the　following　Whiteheadian　statement　by
Cobb：“Amida　or　God　may　be　identified　either　as　creativity
（D加例α肋yαor　Emptiness）as　primordially　characterized　or　as
that　which　primordially　characterizes　creativity．”36
C．Takizawa　and　Tillich：the　Proto－facum　lmmanuel　and　the
　　　Ground　of　Being－the　Two　Ultimates？
　　　　　In　the　above　excerpt　is　evident　Takizawa’sLogos　Christological
view　of　the　problem　of　how　the　religious　ultimate（i．e．，　our
principle　of　God　as“with　us”or　Takizawa’sidea　of　the　boto一加κ〃z
Immanuel　or　Amida　Buddha　as伽翅D勿㎜肋ッα）is　co－etemally
related　to　the　metaphysical　ultimate（i．e．，the　Buddhist　principle
of　Emptiness　emptying　itself　as　Dhamata　Dharmakaンa　which，　for
Takizawa，　is　nothing　other　than　God　the　Father　in　Christian
doctrine）．　However，　it　seems　to　me　that　Takizawa　needs　to
clarify　more　fully　what　he　means　by“co－eternally．”
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　　　　　It　is　precisely　within　this　context　that　I　contend　that　my
Principle　C　mentioned　earlier－namely，　the　principle　of　God　as
“loya1”to　the　frame　of　reference　of　God’sbeing，　Emptiness
emptying　itself　as　the　intra－Trinitarian“interrelatedness”（pm’o聯2sゴs）
within　the　purview　of　Christian　docthne－satisfies　the　requirement
of　the　ultimacy　or　eternity　of　either　of　the　two，　God　as“with
us”≠獅п@Emptiness　emptying　itself．　Namely，　God　as“with　us”is
ultimate紹1ゴg諺゜onsly，　in　the　sense　that　God　is　the　only　one　in　the
universe　who　can　evoke　loyalty　in　us　cratures　simply　because
God　knows　what　loyalty　means　by　God’sown　experience　of
being　loyal　to　Emptiness　emptying　itself；by　contrast，　Emptiness
is　ultimate　me’aphySi’cα〃ッ，　in　the　sense　that　it　is　the　only　Reality
in　the　universe　that　can　empty　itself，　thus　and　only　thus
tuming　to　this　world　of　dependent　co－origination（Skt．，ptatitya－
5α〃zUtpada）　absolultely　affirmatively．
　　　　　And　here，　significantly　enough，　Tillich’snotion　of“the
God　above　the　God　of　theism”（Systematic　Theology，　II，12）
would　be　really　to　the　point．　For“the　God　above　the　God　of
theism”presupposes，　as　far　as　I　can　see，　that　the　God　of
theism　is“surpassed”by　this　God，　the　power　of　being，　and　that
the　former　must　be“loyal”to　the　latter，　And－if　it　is　perrnissible
for　me　to　express　the曲ig　at　issue　here　in　my　own　loyalty－language
further－it　is　only　due　to　the“loyalty”of　the　God　of　theism　to
the　God　above　God　as　the　power　of　being　or　being－itself　that
the　personal　God，　qua　the　Logos，　can　paradoxically　obtain　the
“evocative”垂盾翌?秩D　This　same　idea　seems　to　be　implied（at　least
to　my　mind），　in　order　that　we　may　decipher　it　carefully　enough
in　our　global　age　of　inter－religious　dialogue，　in　what　Tillich
writes　about　the　unique　dynamics　as　this　inheres　in　the　relationship
between“the　abyss　of　the　divine（the　element　of　power）”and
“the　fulness　of　its　content（the　element　of　meaning），”between
“the　divine　depth”and“the　divine　logos”as　follows：
The　first　principle　is　the　basis　of　Godhead，　that　which
makes　God　God．　It　is　the　root　of　his　majesty，　the　unap一
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proachable　intensity　of　his　being，　the　inexhaustible　ground
of　being　in　which　everything　has　its　origin．　It　is　the
power　of　being　infinitely　resisting　nonbeing，　giving　the
power　of　being　to　everything　that　is．（ST，1，250－51）
The　classical　term　logos　is　most　adequate　for　the　second
principle，　that　of　meaning　and　structure．　It　unites　meaningfUl
structure　with　creativity．　Long　before　the　Christian　Era－in
away　already　in　Heraclitus－logos　received　connotations　of
ultimacy　as　well　as　the　meaning　of　being　as　being．　According
to　Parmenides，　being　and　the　logos　of　being　cannot　be
separated．　The　logos　opens　the　divine　grou皿d，　its　infinity
and　its　darkness，　and　it　makes　its　fulness　distinguishable，
definte，　finite．　The　logos　has　been　called　the　mirror　of　the
divine　depth，　the　principle　of　God’sself－objectification．　In
the　logos　God　speaks　his“word，”both　in　himself　and
beyond　himseif．（ST，1，251）．
　　　　　What　I　have　had　in　mind　in　making　the　afore－mentioned
remark　are　specifically　the　last　two　sentences　above．　They　may
be・taken　to　signify　two　things．　First，　the　Logos　loyally　mirrors
or　re－presents　or　exemplifies　in　himself　the　divine　ground　or
abyss，（which　I　myself　might　call　Emptiness　emptying　itseif）as
this　inheres　in　the　intra－Trinitarian“relationality”as　such
（perichoresis），　but　not　in　the　Godhead　as“being，”as　Tillich
mistakenly　assumes（cf．　ST，1，250－51）．The　issue　here　would
be　related　in　part　what　I　called　earlier　Tillich’stotal　mismderstand血g
of　Buddhism　as　simply　negative．　For　he，　on　the　contrary，
seems　to　be　thinking　of　the　Christian　Godhead　as　simply　positively
powerful　by　itself．　However，　I　think　of　the　Godhead　as　utterly
relational，　which　meaning，　rather，　is　coterminous　with　Buddhist
Emptiness　emptying　itself．
　　　　　In　this　sense，　I　concur　with　Masao　Abe　when　he　states
with　respect　to　the　idea　of　God　the　Father　begetting　the　Son　as
follows：
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The　Christian　God　is　not“Being”in　the　sense　that　he
simply　transcends　nihility，　but　a　God　who　has　embraced
even　nothingness　itself，　and　empties　himself．　His　self－negation
of　love　precedes　his　self－negation　in　the　creation　of　the
world，　which　is　other　than　himself．37
It　is　profundly　interesting　to　know　that　the　Christian　doctrine
of　the　Trinity　is　appreciated　and　even　deepened　by　a　Buddhist
thinker　from　his　own　perspective　of　Emptiness．ss
　　　　　　Second，　because　the　Logos　loyally　mirrors　the　divine
ground　or　abyss，　the　Logos　is　entitled　to　speak　by　the　Godhead
itself．　His　speech　is　not　just　due　to　his　own　capability，　but　is
entirely　by　virtue　of　the　Godhead　as　such．　It　is　precisely　in　this
sense　that　Takizawa　wants　to　speak，　with　Shinran，　of　Amida
Buddha’sOriginal　Vow　as　directly　manifesting　in　itself　Hossh6
Hosshin（Skt．，Dharmata　Dharmakaya），　as　we　saw　earlier．　That
is，　Amida　is　Dharmakaya．　By　the　same　token，　we　have　to　say，
on　the　Christian　side，　that　Christ，　as　the　incarnate　Logos，　is
Godhead　as　such．　Thus，　our　solution　to　the　problem　of　the　two
Ultimates，　God　as“with　us”and　the　Ground　of　Being，　ends　up
with　this　insight：because　the　former　is　loyally　manifesting　the
fact　that　it　is　mot　the　latter，　it，　paradoxically，　is　the　latter．　This
truth　lies　at　the　base　of　any　authentic　religion，　whether　Buddhist
or　Christian，　which　constitutes　the　mystery，　for　instance，　of
Jesus’　s　words：“．．．whoever　loses　his　life　for　my　sake　and　the
gospel’swill　save　it”（Mark　8：35）．In　other　words，　it　is　the
power　of　resurrection　as　such！
ConluSz°（ms．・
　　1．Religious　RevoIution　for　Today
　　　　　Tillich　was　one　of　the　forerunners　of　the　religious　revolution，
or　of　the　radical　transformation　of　the　vision　of“God　and　the
world”for　today，　breaking　the　barriers　between　Christianity　and
other　Ways，　especially　Buddhism．　This　revolution　was　enabled
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by　his　turn　from　Jesus－centeredness　to　Logos－centeredness，　as
is　manifest　in　his　view　of　the　self－surrender　of　Jesus　to　Jesus
who　is　the　Christ　as　constituting　the　New　Being（ST，　III，
146）．
　　　　　This　must　be，　I　believe，　at　the　core　of　Tillich’scelebrated
last　public　lecture“The　Significance　of　the　History　of　Religions
for　the　Systematic　Theologian”that　ends　with　these　words：
The　universality　of　a　religious　statement　does　not　lie　in
an　a11－embracing　abstraction　which　would　destroy　religion
as　such，　but　it　lies　in　the　depths　of　every　concrete　religion．
Above　all　it　lies　in　the　openness　to　spiritual　freedom　both
from　one’sown　foundation　and　for　one’　s　own　foundation．
（FR，94）
　　　　　After　disclosing　in　these　words　his　inmost　hope　for　the
future　of　theology，　looking　forward　to“another　or　different
fragmentary　manifestation　of　theonomy　or　of　the　Concrete
Spirit，”the　seventyreight－year－old　pioneer　theologian　of　religions
died　ten　days　later．　Our　other　dialogue－partner　in　this　prticle，
Katsumi　Takizawa　concurs　with　Tillich’svisionσf　the　transformation
of　theology　when　he　has　pointed　out　the　necessity　of　a“religious
revolution”in　which　no　longer　can　any　religion　selfrcomplacently
confine　itself　within　itself．　Gautama　and　Jesus，　for　instance，have
seen　that　the　Truth　of　life　itself　alone　is　decisively　important　to
them，　not　their　own　religions，　Buddhism　and　Christianity。39
　2．Logos　Christology　in，　a　Global　Age：the　Logos，　Wisdom，
　　　　and　the　Kingdom　of　God
　　　　　Their　common　Logos－centeredness，　enabling　a　religious
revolution　to　occur　for　today，　was　then　related　to　their　critical
concern　for　the　problem　of　quasi－religion（s）guided　by　the
principle　of　the　Kingdom　of　God．　From　my　own　perspective，
the　principle　of　God　as“evocative”is　enabled　to　come　out　by
the　principle　of　God　as“with　us，”namely，　Takizawa’sidea　of
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the　Proto－faCtum　Immanuel　which　he　identifies　with　the　Buddhist
notion　of　hongaku（i．e．，original　enlightenment）．　Tillich　too
regards　Wisdom　as　distinguishable　from　and　going　beyond　the
cleavage　of　subject　and　object　peculiar　to　objectifying　knowledge
（ST，　III，256）．
　　　　　However，　when　it　comes　to　speaking　of　Dynamic　Typology，
Tillich　contrasts　the　symbol　of　the　Kingdom　of　God　and　its
principle，　participation，　with　the　Buddhist　Nirvana　and　its
principle，　identity．　And　he　has　betrayed　a　misunderstanding　of
Buddhism　as　negativistic．　He　does　not　know　the　dynamism　of
Emptiness　emptying　itself．　By　the　same　token，　Takizawa　is　not
totally　right　in　criticizing　Hisamatsu’svision　of　the　enlightened
（i．e．，Buddhas）as　those　who　identify　themselves　with　the
absolutely　preceding　Eternal　Buddha．　For　Takizawa　does　not
make　it　clear　that　the　notion　of　the　Proto一ノiZctum　Immanuel　is
usable　theologically　in　two　ways：first，　hierarchically　in　terms
of　the　particular’srelation　to　the　Logos　or　Amida　or　H∂ben
Hosshin（Upaya　Buddha）which　is　further　related　to　Dharmakaya
or　H∂sshO　Hosshin；and　second，　synthetically　in　terms　of　the
particular’sdirect　relation　to　Buddhahood　or、Oharmaka二ya　to
which　the　particular　is　at　the　same　time　related　hierarchically
m°≠`mida　as乙lpaya　Buddha．　In　Takizawa　there　is　no　clear
reference　to　the　particular’s“direct”relation　to　Buddhahood　or
Dharmaleaya，　unassisted　by　the　Logos　or　Amida．39a　I　myself
would　like　to　include　both　ways，　synthetic　and　hierarchical，　in
terms　of　a　creative　use　of　one　of　the　Thomistic　types　of　analogy：
Analogy　of　Attribution　dMm　nd　tertium（two　to　the　third）．
　　　　　　My　own　final　proposal，　then，　is　the　thesis　of　God’s
loyalty　to　Buddhist　Nothingness　or　Emptiness　that　I　would　like
to　add　to　the　two　principles　that　I　can　find　in　Tillich’sand
Takizawa’sLogos　Christologies，　ones　that　have　demonstrated
themselves　to　be　effective　in　dialogue　with　Buddhism．　It　is　like
this：（1）God，卿the　L（）gos，　is　loyal　to　Emptiness；（2）Emptiness
empties　itself；and（3）God　is　the　only　one　in　the　universe　who
can　evoke　loyalty　in　us　creatures．　Tillich　seems　to　have　something
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that　can　encourage　this　thesis　of　mine　in　his　doctrine　of　the
“divine　abyss”or“God　above　God”for　whom　the　Logos　plays
the　role　of“mirror”in　that　the　Logos　speaks　and　manifests．
And　Takizawa　too　emphatically　presents　the　truth　that　when
the　Logos　speaks，　he　discloses　for　us　the　entire　Godhead　as
such　in　him．
　　　　　In　this　particular　sense，　Jesus　is　the　Christ，　God．　That
is，　he　representsαs　the　Christ（i．e．，　the　incarnate　Logos）the
entire　Godhead　for　us　in　his　act　of　being　as　a　human　person
who　authentically　cor－responds　to　the　Logos，卿the　Proto一吻伽m
Immanuel，　who　originally　reflects　in　himself　in　terms　of　the
“original　enlightenment”the　divine　abyss　as　such　in　the　sense
of　Emptiness　emptying　itself　an°thin　the　Godhead．
　　　With　this　renewed　vision　of　Logos　Christology　in　mind，　we
should　proceed　to　take　into　account　and　fulfill　today’smandates
on　a　global　scale．　In　this　respect，　I　concur　with　Robert　C．
Neville　in　holding　that　there　are　at　least　two　themes　in　both
Buddhism　and　Christianity　that　have　great　relevance　to　our　own
historical　situation　where　post－modernism　is　a　temporary　and
rather　unimportant　movement　due　to　the　fact　that　the　modern
period　died，　down　to　its　very　God．　He　writes：
First，　the　overcoming　of　selfisheness　or　world－defining
attachments　is　crucial　for　addressing　the　global　travail
about　distributive　justice．　Second，　the　sacredness　of
creation，　the　continuity　of　human　life　with　the　rest　of
cre　ation　，　or　the　mutual　immanence　of　person　and　world，
are　crucial　themes　for　recovering　a　global　philosophy　of
nature　for　addressing　deep　problems　of　ecology．40
　　　　　What，　then，　is　Neville’sbasic　theological　orientation　in
this　new　historical　context　requiring　the　solution　to　these　two
issues？Iattend　to　his　following　remark：
Finaly，　although　the　Kyoto　School　and　the　existential
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school［of　Thomas　Altizer］agree　that　the　passage　into
the　depths　of　reality　findS　abSolute　nothingness　or　indeterrninate
being－itself　at　the　end，　the　reverse　passage　of　reality　from
that　ground　to　the　ordina】ry　world　of　determinate　things
involves　creativity，　not　the　kenotic　negation　of　ground
［as　in　Masao　Abe’skenotic　philosophy］．　So　kenosis　is
not　at　the　heart　of　the　ontological　question　for　either
Buddhism　or　Christiantiy．（BGM，113）
And　I　think　from　my　own　aforementioned　threefold　perspective
of　the　theology　of　God’sloyalty　to　Emptiness　that　Neville’s
reference　to　the“passage　into　the　depths　of　reality”（which
seems　to　correspond　to　our　second　element，“Emptiness　emptying
itself”）and　his　emphasis　upon　the“reverse　passage　of　reality
from　that　ground　to　the　ordinary　world　of　deteminate　things”
（which　I　consider　in　terms　of　the　third　notion　of　the“evocative
Deity”jmay　need　a　connecting　link．
　　　　　My　first　idea　of“God’sloyalty　to　Emptiness”is　an　attempt
at　meeting　the　requirement　of　that　connecting　link　between　the
two　passages．　As　such，　in　the　present－day　global，　theological
arena　it　apologetically－theologically　opts　for　the　middle－path
position　which　can　mediate　between　and　connect　Masao　Abe’s
Buddhist　standpoint　of“tota14脚雁c　mozAement　of　emptying［as
emptying　itself］，　not　a　static　state　of　emptying”（EG，28）and
Hans　Kung’sChristian　view　of　theonomy　that　can　provide“a
basis　for　the　absoluteness　and　universality　of　ethical　demands。”41
1n　conclusion，　it　is　precisely　here　that　my　vision　of　Logos
Christology　has　its　unique　theological　voice　which，　however，　is
voiceless　at　its　hidden　core　（cf．　Ps．19：3－4）．
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